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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 17, 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down a long awaited 
opinion concerning the constitutionality of a law banning a single, specific abortion 
procedure.1  The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (the Act) criminalized a surgical 
procedure known as “intact D & E” or “D & X” [hereafter D & X].2  The method, 
                                                                
+Winner of the University of Houston Law Center’s 2006 Robert S. Toth LLM Writing 
Award.  The author revised this article to reflect changes in the litigation. 
*Associate, Jones Vargas, Las Vegas, Nevada; LL.M., 2006, University of Houston Law 
Center; J.D., 2004, Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.   
1Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
2Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (2004).  D & E refers to dilation and extraction. 
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which is extremely rare and used only after the first trimester of pregnancy, is known 
outside of the medical community as “partial-birth abortion.”3    
In the months of litigation leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision to review 
the Act, opponents had expressed two primary concerns.  First, the Act lacked an 
exception for the health of the mother.  The Supreme Court mandated such an 
exception in Roe v. Wade and reaffirmed its position numerous times, most recently 
in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.4  Second, while 
proponents claimed it applied only to D & X, it was actually broad enough to include 
all surgical techniques used after thirteen and one third weeks of gestation, thus, 
imposing an undue burden on women undergoing abortion after that point.  
Three federal districts courts agreed with those challenging the Act.  The 
decisions of these courts were upheld by the circuit courts which reviewed the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.5  For guidance, all of the courts reviewing 
the Act relied on a 2000 Supreme Court opinion finding almost identical language in 
a Nebraska law to be unconstitutional.6  Surprisingly, the Supreme Court agreed to 
review two of the circuit court cases. 
Before the Supreme Court accepted certiorari, in what appeared to be no more 
than an attempt to circumvent the judicial system, the 109th United States Congress 
considered a new abortion measure.  If passed, the Unborn Child Pain Awareness 
Act would have forced abortion providers to deliver a scripted message to women 
requesting abortion services.7  Under this legislation, physicians violate the law 
unless they inform patients who have attained thirteen and one third weeks of 
pregnancy that “the process of being killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child 
pain.”8  Sponsors claimed that the bill merely required “informed consent” but 
opponents contended that the language was meant to dissuade women from 
undergoing second trimester abortions.  Congress was also criticized for choosing 
physicians to deliver the government’s message about fetal pain, a topic on which 
the medical community has not reached a consensus.   
                                                                
3Id.  In 2001, 1.4 percent of abortions were performed at twenty-one weeks or more.  Lilo 
T. Strauss et al., Abortion Surveillance --- United States, 2001, 53 (SS09) MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 1-32 (2004), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5309a1.htm (last visited May 22, 2007). 
4Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (stating that “our 
precedents hold, that a State may not restrict access to abortions that are ‘necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the mother’”). See also 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–165 (1973), “[i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is 
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother”).  
5Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. 
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
6Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948 (2000).   
7Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, H.R. 356, 109th Cong. (2005); see also 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005). 
8Id. 
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Laws mandating disclosure of particular information are known as informed 
consent laws.  They exist primarily in the area of reproductive health and most often 
apply to women seeking abortion.  This article discusses the legal and ethical issues 
that arise when lawmakers decide what patients must be told before they can access 
certain medical procedures.    
Part II examines some of the ethical implications of informed consent laws.  
Physicians have a duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent before acting.9  The 
duty to inform arises from the principle of individual autonomy.10  In the past, 
physicians were sometimes accused of withholding material information from 
patients.  This paternalism was justified on the ground that the patient would not 
want to know all of the negative or unpleasant facts.  As a result of litigation, 
legislation, and a change in public perception about the appropriate balance in the 
doctor-patient relationship, physician paternalism has given way to patient self-
determination.11   
Part III discusses legal concerns raised by informed consent laws.  These include 
the First Amendment free speech rights of physicians12 and patients’ right to obtain 
their physicians’ advice and counsel without government interference.13  This article 
examines two United States Supreme Court cases that addressed these aspects of 
informed consent and the implications of the Court’s holdings for fetal pain informed 
consent legislation.14 
Part IV reviews two recent pieces of federal legislation with the potential to 
significantly affect abortion practice and the lives of women who seek abortion 
services.  The first law, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, criminalized two 
common abortion procedures.15  Although signed into law in 2003,16 implementation 
of the Act was enjoined by three federal courts.17  Ultimately, the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits were reversed by the United 
States Supreme Court.18  
                                                                
9Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972). “The doctrine that a consent 
effective as authority to perform therapy can arise only from the patient’s understanding of 
alternatives to and risks of the therapy is commonly denominated ‘informed consent.’”  Id. at 
780 n.15 (citation omitted). 
10Id. at 786. 
11Id. 
12Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
13Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
14Rust, 500 U.S. at 173; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
15Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).  
16Id. 
17Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 437 F.3d 
278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp 2d 957 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (D. 
Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005). 
18Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); 
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 127 S. 
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Prior to the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart decision, members of Congress introduced 
a second bill aimed at eliminating mid-trimester surgical abortions.  The Unborn 
Child Pain Awareness Act would criminalize the performance of abortions after 
thirteen-and-one-third weeks of pregnancy without first informing the patient that 
the fetus would experience profound pain.19  Additionally, it required the abortion 
provider to offer the option of fetal anesthesia.20  Judging from the title, it was not 
readily apparent that the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act was aimed at curbing 
late-term abortion but the surrounding circumstances suggested just that.  This 
article argues that Congress’s use of this back door approach to achieving its 
objective actually undermined its credibility and its chance for success.  
Part V briefly reviews the cases that identified and defined the constitutional 
right to an abortion.21  It then discusses cases where courts considered the 
constitutionality of informed consent laws and compares the reasoning of those 
courts to the arguments likely to be raised in any challenge to the federal Unborn 
Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005. 
Part VI summarizes the findings of a team of physicians at the University of 
California at San Francisco, concluding that fetal perception of pain is unlikely prior 
to twenty-nine weeks gestation.  Reaction to the article, which appeared in the 
August 2005 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, was positive 
for the most part.22  Some physicians as well as pro-life advocates, however, 
criticized the article as no more than an effort to discredit fetal pain legislation. 
II. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 
“[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine  
for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.”23 
 
Informed consent encompasses the principle that an individual is entitled to 
decide what will happen to her body.  Furthermore, based on this individual right 
physicians incur a duty to inform each patient about the potential risks and benefits 
of any recommended medical treatment.24  The physician’s duty arises from the 
concept, “fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body. . . .’”25  
                                                           
Ct. 1610 (2007). The Supreme Court heard oral argument in both cases on Nov. 8, 2006. It 
handed down an opinion in April 2007. 
19Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).   
20Id. 
21Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
22Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 
294 JAMA 947, 947-54 (2005). 
23Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
24Id. at 780. “True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a 
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options and the risks 
attendant upon each.” Id. 
25Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). 
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In the seminal informed consent case, Cantebury v. Spence, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit held that a physician has a duty to communicate the specific 
information that a patient needs to make an informed decision.26  Other courts judged 
the extent of the physician’s duty by what prudent physicians disclosed in similar 
circumstances.27  The Cantebury court rejected this reasoning, finding that neither 
the obligation to disclose nor the scope of disclosure originates from a community 
standard.28  Instead, the physician’s duty and the scope of his obligation to inform 
originate from the patient’s right of self-determination.29 That right cannot be 
exercised effectively unless the patient possesses “enough information to enable an 
intelligent choice.”30  Thus, the scope of the physician’s duty requires disclosure of 
information that the patient would find material to making a treatment decision, to 
weighing the risks associated with having or not having the treatment, and to decide 
on any alternative treatment.31   
The Cantebury court recognized that there are two instances where a physician 
holds the privilege not to disclose.32  The first arises in an emergency situation where 
a patient is incapable of consent.33  The second situation is one where the disclosure 
may be so detrimental to the patient that it is medically contraindicated.34 The second 
exception provides leeway for the physician to determine, within limits, what is in a 
patient’s best interests to know and to tailor disclosure to a patient’s unique 
circumstance.35 This exception has been invoked in the context of informed consent 
for abortion. Some physicians feel that giving a detailed account of the effect of 
abortion on the fetus is harmful to the health interests of the patient.36 
                                                                
26Id. at 781. 
27Id. at 783-84. 
28Id. at 780-81, 786.  
In our view, the patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to 
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough 
information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s 
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that 
need is the information material to the decision. 
Id. at 786. 
29Id. at 780-81.  
30Id. at 786. 
31Id. at 782. 
32Id. at 788. 
33Id.  
34Id. at 789. 
35Id.  
36Permits Human Stem Cell Research in New Jersey: Hearing on S.1909 Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Human Serv., and Senior Citizens, 2002-2003 Leg. Sess. (Nov. 4, 2002) 
(statement of Dr. Dianne Irving, Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University of America) 
[hereinafter Statement of Dr. Dianne Irving], available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/media/ 
archive_audio2.asp?KEY=SHH&SESSION=2002. 
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There are three important public policy reasons behind designating to physicians 
responsibility for obtaining the informed consent of patients.  First, physicians have 
knowledge and experience beyond that of the average patient, putting them in a 
position to provide information about disease processes, risks and benefits of 
potential treatments, and prognoses.37  Second, the personal and intimate nature of 
the doctor-patient relationship invites the patient to rely on the advice and expertise 
of the physician.38  Third, the idea that physicians owe patients a duty of care is 
already established in tort law, such that failure to obtain a patient’s informed 
consent breaches that duty and gives rise to a claim of negligence.39 The underlying 
public policy is to ensure that patients have sufficient facts for making health care 
decisions. Physicians are uniquely qualified and properly motivated to see that 
patients get the information they need. 
The scope of informed consent in the context of a decision regarding abortion has 
been thoroughly examined through litigation.  In 1992, the United States Supreme 
Court found that a Pennsylvania informed consent law did not intrude on a 
physician’s prerogative to tailor information to the needs of individual patients.40  
The law at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
contained an exception to the informed consent requirement where the physician 
determined that disclosing certain information would have “a severely adverse effect 
on the physical or mental health of the patient.”41  If a statute mandated informed 
consent but failed to include an exception like the one found in Casey, the common 
law exception to the duty to disclose recognized in Cantebury would still permit 
physicians to withhold information that would adversely affect a patient’s health. 42 
The duty to inform suggests several questions of particular significance to 
abortion providers.  First, in the rapidly evolving field of medicine, what should be 
the extent of a physician’s duty to possess “state of the art” knowledge?  At least one 
commentator has called for a standard that would require physicians providing 
abortion services to stay abreast of research on fetal development in order to inform 
patients of the “most internationally agreed upon, objective, current, and accurate 
scientific facts.”43  This could include advances in fetal neurology, fetal 
consciousness, and fetal pain. Dr. Dianne Irving, a professor of philosophy at the 
                                                                
37Cantebury, 464 F.2d at 787. “Indeed, with knowledge of, or ability to learn, his patient’s 
background and current condition, he is in a position superior to that of most others--attorneys, 
for example--who are called upon to make judgments on pain of liability in damages for 
unreasonable miscalculation (citation omitted).”  Id. 
38Id. at 782. “The patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which 
traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with armslength transactions.  
His dependence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being … is well-nigh 
abject.” Id.   
39Id. at 781, 783. 
40Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
41Id. at 883-84. 
42Cantebury, 464 F.2d at 788-89. 
43Statement of Dr. Dianne Irving, supra note 36.  Dr. Irving is a former bench research 
biochemist and biologist with the National Institutes of Health—National Cancer Institute. 
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Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., testified before a New Jersey 
Senate Committee about the ethical implications of informed consent and legislation 
regulating fetal stem cell research and human cloning.44 She claimed that, “‘informed 
consent’ requires that full, accurate, and truthful information be disseminated to all 
concerned decision makers.” Dr. Irving maintained that in a discussion of informed 
consent requirements, the first inquiry must be into the state of existing scientific 
evidence.45  Like abortion, this is a highly disruptive subject often open to emotional 
appeals from those on both sides of the debate.  Both topics raise the question of 
when human life begins.  Dr. Irving based her conclusions about the beginning of 
human life on the findings of the Nomina Embryologica Committee, an international 
body “consisting of over 20 of the best and brightest human embryologist’s from 
around the world.”46  If policy makers fail to rely on internationally agreed upon 
scientific facts, she warned that “public policy will continue to be irresponsibly 
based on mere fantasies and wishful thinking.”47 
Physicians’ duty to inform suggests a second question.  Where informed consent 
statutes essentially substitute the judgment of lawmakers for the judgment of 
physicians, should legislators be expected to be equally as informed as physicians 
must be?  Politicians are increasingly involved in regulating the content of informed 
consent.  As such, it follows that any standard governing physicians’ level of 
knowledge must apply equally to legislators.  While this makes logical sense, there is 
presently no mechanism in place, other than the democratic process, to ensure that 
policy makers are adequately informed.  By contrast, a well developed system exists 
for monitoring physician practice, including oversight by federal, state, and various 
private agencies.  A physician must meet state licensure requirements, adhere to 
federal guidelines if participating in federally funded programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, comply with federal standards to qualify for a license to prescribe 
controlled substances, and practice in conformance with the regulations imposed by 
the hospital(s) where she has staff privileges.48  A physician may be further regulated 
by professional organizations and specialty boards. Medical malpractice litigation is 
another means of enforcing adherence to recognized standards of care.  If legislators 
are allowed to be the arbiters of what information should be communicated by 
doctors to their patients, then a similar regulatory scheme should apply to them.  For 
practical purposes, it is difficult to imagine how our present system of government 
might accomplish this. 
A congressional body cannot possess the qualities deemed necessary for 
determining what information patients need in order to make educated health care 
                                                                
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Id. “After reviewing the latest research studies in human embryology, [the Nomina 
Embryologica Committee’s] deliberations are published in the Nomina Embryologica, part of 
the larger Nomina Anatomica, and are professionally required to be used, along with The 
Carnegie Stages of Early Human Development, by all human embryologists in their own 
work.” Id. 
47Id. 
4861 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 9 (2006); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and 
Surgeons § 9 (2006). 
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decisions.  Yet through the introduction of informed consent laws, Congress and 
state legislatures around the country are challenging physicians for the right to make 
these determinations.  At their core, informed consent laws are no more than an 
attempt to substitute the judgment of elected politicians for that of physicians.  This 
article argues that legislative bodies, for the reasons suggested above, are not well 
suited to decide what is in patients’ best interests.  Physicians are still far better 
equipped to inform and advise their patients.   
Cantebury v. Spence held that physicians must disclose information material to a 
patient’s decision.49  Today, this means that physicians should be familiar enough 
with contemporary research to understand how it might apply to their patients.  
Whether it is in a particular patient’s best interest to have specific information, 
however, is still a decision for physicians, not lawmakers.50   
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT LAWS 
In the past, physicians resisted informed consent laws on the basis that a 
legislatively imposed mandate to disclose particular information violated their First 
Amendment free speech rights.51  There is established First Amendment precedent 
for this argument.52  Before it became a health care issue, the question of compelled 
speech was raised in other contexts.53  In the 1940’s, the United States Supreme 
Court twice considered whether public school students could be forced to participate 
in patriotic exercises that included a pledge of allegiance to the United States, where 
the school child or his parents objected to the content of the pledge.54  Reversing its 
earlier precedent,55 the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 
held that compelling an individual to speak infringed his rights in the same way that 
restricting his speech did.56  Barnette and later cases challenging compelled speech in 
schools differ in two important ways from current challenges to mandatory informed 
consent laws.  First, the Court recognized that the students in Barnette were 
                                                                
49See generally Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
50Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (D.N.D. 1980).  The court considered a bill 
requiring physicians to disclose: 
the ‘probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at the 
time the abortion is to be performed….’ The physician must be permitted to exercise 
medical judgment and determine to what extent, if any, disclosure in this area is in the 
patient's best interest.  To require such disclosure to every patient impermissibly 
injects the state into the private physician-patient relationship.   
Id. 
51See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
52W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
53Id. See also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
54Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624; Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586. 
55Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586. 
56Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. 
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essentially being forced to adopt an ideology.57  Laws requiring physicians to make 
statements to patients about government’s appraisal of the risks and benefits 
associated with a proposed treatment do not force physicians to accept the 
government’s view as their own.58  Second, the Court emphasized that children are 
particularly vulnerable to coercion.59 Informed consent laws, on the other hand, apply 
to physicians, a group that is not so readily coerced. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court directly addressed physicians’ free speech rights in 
Rust v. Sullivan.60  In Rust, family planning clinics that received Title X funds were 
ineligible for the funding if they offered abortion services, including counseling.61  
Physicians were not permitted to discuss abortion as an option or even to refer a 
patient to another clinic that could present the full range of alternatives.62  Physicians 
working in these clinics brought suit, claiming that the regulation abridged their free 
speech rights and unduly interfered with the doctor-patient relationship.63  The Court 
disagreed with the physicians.64  Instead, the Court reframed the issue as whether 
Congress could impose restrictions as a condition of receiving a federal grant.65  The 
grantee was free to reject Title X funds and continue to counsel patients about 
abortion services; thus, there was no government interference with speech.66   
The Court also rejected the physician’s contention that the regulation imposed 
significantly on the doctor-patient relationship.67  The clinics provided family 
planning services only.  The doctor-patient relationship, therefore, was not 
“sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the 
patient of comprehensive medical advice.”68  A patient would, therefore, not mistake 
the clinic physician’s silence about abortion to mean that the physician did not 
consider abortion an alternative in her case.69  The Court also noted that the 
regulations did not require any physician “to represent as his own any opinion that he 
does not in fact hold.”70  
                                                                
57Id. at 633. The pledge and salute require an “affirmation of a belief and an attitude of 
mind.” Id. 
58Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
59Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 






66Id. at 199. “Title X subsidies are just that, subsidies . . . to avoid the force of the 
regulations, [the recipient] can simply decline the subsidy.” Id. 
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In 1992, the Supreme Court considered an informed consent law imposing a duty 
on physicians to affirmatively provide specific information to patients undergoing 
abortion.71  Unlike the physicians in Rust, these doctors were not receiving 
government grants.72  The statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. 
Casey specified that a physician performing an abortion must “inform the woman of 
the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of 
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’”73  In addition, the 
physician or a “qualified nonphysician” was required to “inform the woman of the 
availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus. . . .”74   
The doctors argued that they had a First Amendment right “not to provide 
information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the 
State.”75  While agreeing that the Pennsylvania law implicated the physicians’ First 
Amendment rights not to speak, the Supreme Court found that the rights applied only 
to the physicians’ practice of medicine, which was already subject to regulation and 
licensure by the states.76  Furthermore, the law itself contained an exception.77  
Physicians were not required to disclose information to a patient where disclosure 
would adversely affect the patient’s physical or mental health.78 
Under Rust and Casey, the federal government is free to restrict speech as a 
condition for the receipt of grant money.  The case law allows states to go further 
and impose “informed consent” obligations on all doctors, at least to the extent that 
any such law contains an exception in cases where disclosure would adversely affect 
a patient.   
IV. FEDERAL ABORTION LEGISLATION 
A. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
President Bush signed the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act [hereinafter 
PBABA] into law on November 5, 2003.79  Congress passed the law partially out of 
                                                                
71Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
72Id.  
73Id. at 881. 
74Id. Additionally, the statute required the physician or qualified nonphysician to provide 
“information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the 
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to 
abortion.” Id. 
75Id. at 884. 
76Id. at 885. 
77Id. at 883. 
78Id. at 883-84.  In order to exercise this exception the physician must be able to 
“demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that 
furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or 
mental health of the patient.” Id. 
79Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).  
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concern that fetuses were subjected to pain during late-term abortion procedures.80  
Given its conclusion that a fetus is capable of experiencing pain, Congress deemed 
partial-birth abortion, also termed D&X, to be exceptionally barbaric and cruel.81  
The PBABA was enacted to stop D&X abortions.  D&X was only minimally 
different from another method common in the second trimester of pregnancy known 
as intact D&E.82 In a challenge to a Nebraska law with language similar to the 
federal ban,83 the United States Supreme Court held that the wording used was broad 
enough to encompass both D&E and D&X.84  Since the statute outlawed D&E and 
D&X, the two most common procedures used for late-term abortions, it placed an 
                                                                
80§ 1531, Congressional Findings § 2(14)(M). “It is a medical fact, however, that unborn 
infants at this stage can feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their perception of 
this pain is even more intense than that of newborn infants and older children when subjected 
to the same stimuli.” Id.  
81Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Two procedures are currently 
referred to as partial-birth abortion: “intact D&E” and “D&X.”  From the perspective of fetal 
pain, these procedures are arguably more humane than D&E.  In an intact D&E abortion, the 
fetus is delivered intact into the vagina. “If the fetus presents head first the physician collapses 
the skull of the fetus and then removes the ‘intact’ fetus.” If the fetus presents feet first, the 
physician “pulls the fetal body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus 
through the cervix.”  The D&E involves grasping a fetus with clamps and pulling it through a 
partially dilated maternal cervix into the vagina.  Cervical resistance causes dismemberment of 
the fetus while the brain and neurological system remain intact.  
82Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948 (2000).   
83Id. at 921-22.  The Supreme Court described the Nebraska Act as: 
‘No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is 
necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical 
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical 
condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.’ The statute defines ‘partial 
birth abortion’ as: ‘an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion 
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and 
completing the delivery.’ It further defines ‘partially delivers vaginally a living unborn 
child before killing the unborn child’ to mean ‘deliberately and intentionally 
delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the 
purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows 
will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.’ 
Id. (citations omitted).  See also Stuart Derbyshire, Late Abortion and the ‘Fetal Pain’ 
Fallacy: The USA’s Ban on ‘Partial-Birth Abortion’ Rests on Flawed Arguments About Fetal 
Development, Spiked Essays, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000 
000CA93C.htm. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 prohibits: 
[A]n abortion in which the person performing the abortion (A) deliberately and 
intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first 
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of a 
breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the 
partially delivered fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of 
delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus. 
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
84Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.  
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undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion after twenty weeks gestation; 
therefore, the legislation was found unconstitutional.85 
Under the PBABA, a practitioner employing one of the banned methods could be 
fined up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars and sentenced to up to two years in 
prison.86  Shortly after the bill was signed into law, Dr. Leroy Carhart, the National 
Abortion Federation, and Planned Parenthood each filed for an injunction to prevent 
its implementation.87 The various plaintiffs alleged that the PBABA was 
unconstitutional because it did not contain an exception allowing the procedures 
when necessary to preserve a woman’s health.88  In addition, they asserted that the 
PBABA was unconstitutionally vague, imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right 
to choose an abortion, served no legitimate state interest, violated women’s right to 
equal protection under the law, and provided a constitutionally insufficient exception 
for allowing procedures to save a woman’s life.89   
Concurrent trials were conducted in federal courts in New York, California, and 
Nebraska.90  All three courts concluded that the law was unconstitutional.91  Each of 
the decisions was appealed and upheld by the appropriate Court of Appeals.92  In a 
lengthy and detailed opinion in one of the cases, Carhart v. Ashcroft, Federal District 
Court Judge Richard Kopf recounted the testimony of dozens of physicians who 
provided abortions.93  Applying Supreme Court precedent, Judge Kopf found the ban 
unconstitutional on the ground that it lacked a health exception.94  The Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling.95  While this 
                                                                
85Id. at 914. The court does not define “late-term abortion” but seems to use “abortion 
after twenty weeks gestation” and “late-term abortion” interchangeably. 
86Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
87Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Carhart v. 
Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004). 
88The United States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), 
that such an exception is a requisite component of any restrictive scheme. See also Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).  
89Derbyshire, supra note 83.  Stuart Derbyshire is assistant professor of radiology and 
anesthesiology at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. 
90Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp 2d at 436; Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 320 F. 
Supp 2d at 957; Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805. 
91Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp 2d at 436; Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 320 F. 
Supp 2d at 957; Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805. 
92Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood 
Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); 
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  
93Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805 (Kopf, J.). 
94Id. 
95The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.  
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
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litigation was in progress over the constitutionality of the PBABA, Congress 
introduced similar legislation under the guise of preventing fetal pain.96   
B.  Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005 
In January 2005, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) and various co-sponsors 
introduced a bill entitled the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005 [hereinafter 
UCPA Act]; its stated purpose was “[t]o ensure that women seeking an abortion are 
fully informed regarding the pain experienced by their unborn child.”97  The UCPA 
Act arose out of concern over the capacity of a fetus to experience pain.98  Whether 
fetuses perceive pain has been debated for over two decades99 but testimony 
presented during the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act trials regarding the severe pain 
experienced by the fetus renewed congressional concern.100   
 The UCPA Act states in pertinent part: 
An abortion provider or the provider’s agent . . . shall make the following 
oral statement to the pregnant woman . . . :  You are considering having 
                                                                
96Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill included 
language similar to that found in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, describing the 
abortion methods commonly used at twenty weeks after fertilization.  
Examples of abortion methods used twenty weeks after fertilization include, but are 
not limited to the following: 
(A) The Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) method of abortion is commonly performed 
in the second trimester of pregnancy. In a dilation and evacuation abortion, the unborn 
child’s body parts are grasped at random with a long-toothed clamp. The fetal body 
parts are then torn off of the body and pulled out of the vaginal canal. The remaining 
body parts are grasped and pulled out until only the head remains. The head is then 
grasped and crushed in order to remove it from the vaginal canal.  
(B) Partial-Birth Abortion is an abortion in which the abortion practitioner delivers an 
unborn child’s body until only the head remains inside the womb, punctures the back 
of the child’s skull with a sharp instrument, and sucks the child’s brains out before 
completing the delivery of the dead infant. 
Id. 
97Id. Similar legislation was introduced by Rep. Christopher Smith [R-NJ] in 2004.  See 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2004, H.R. 4420, 108th Cong. (2004), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill= h108-4420. Three states enacted legislation in 
2005 requiring physicians who provide abortions or abortion counseling to instruct patients 
that a fetus feels pain.  See Act of May 10, 2005, Woman’s Right to Know Act, H.B. 197 (to 
be codified at GA. CODE ANN. §31-9A-4); see also Unborn Child Pain Awareness and 
Prevention Act of 2005, No. 1696 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§20-16-1101-1111); 
see also H.F. 235, 2005 Leg. 84th Sess. (Mo. 2005).  
98Press Release, United States Senator Sam Brownback, Brownback Reintroduces Unborn 
Child Pain Bill (Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm 
?id=230920.   
99Teresa S. Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 161, 161 
(2003). 
100Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the H. Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Dr. 
Mark G. Neerhof, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Northwestern University 
Mecial School). 
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an abortion of an unborn child who will have developed, at the time of the 
abortion, approximately XX weeks after fertilization. The Congress of the 
United States has determined that at this stage of development, an unborn 
child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain . . . 
Congress finds that there is substantial evidence that the process of being 
killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child pain, even though you 
receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs . . . [Y]ou have the option of 
choosing to have anesthesia . . . administered directly to the pain-capable 
unborn child if you so desire. The purpose of administering such drug or 
drugs would be to reduce or eliminate the capacity of the unborn child to 
experience pain during the abortion procedure. In some cases, there may 
be some additional risk to you associated with administering such a 
drug.101 
Congress’ rationale for enacting federal legislation was government’s “interest in 
reducing the number of events in which great pain is inflicted on sentient 
creatures.”102 Congress analogized the UCPA Act to federal legislation protecting 
animals during transportation and slaughter and laws protecting animals used in 
research.103 The scientific community has criticized the UCPA Act and the 
underlying medical science used to justify it.104  The legislation has three obvious 
flaws, which undermine the credibility of Congress as fact finder. First, the 
legislation is inconsistent with its stated goals.  The bill was intended to reduce the 
suffering of sentient creatures, yet it fails to consider fetal pain in all situations 
where it may arise.105  Second, the scientific support for the bill is not accepted by 
the majority of experts in science and medicine.106  Third, Congress invited 
testimony from scientists who agree with its findings about fetal pain to the 
exclusions of those who do not.107 
The ostensible purpose of the bill is to eliminate fetal pain, yet the bill does not 
address fetal pain in any context other than abortion.  If Congress truly meant to 
reduce fetal suffering it would have imposed similar informed consent standards in 
all situations where a fetus might feel pain.  For example, if, as Congress found, a 
fetus is capable of experiencing pain at twenty weeks after fertilization, then 
                                                                
101Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. § 2902 (2005) 
(emphasis added). 
102Id. at § 2(7). 
103Id. at § 2(7)(A)-(C). 
104Derbyshire, supra note 83. 
105Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, § 2(7). “There is a valid Federal 
Government interest in reducing the number of events in which great pain is inflicted on 
sentient creatures.” Id. 
106See, e.g., W. Huang et al., Management of Fetal Pain During Invasive Fetal 
Procedures: A Review, 55 ACTA ANAESTHESIOLOGICA BELGICA 119 (2004); Lee, supra note 
22. 
107For example, Congress heard testimony from Dr. K.S. Anand, who testified for the 
federal government in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act trials, but did not invite the 
University of California at San Francisco investigators to present evidence.   
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certainly a full-term fetus experiences significant pain during labor and the process 
of birth.108  Modern diagnostic techniques enable physicians to diagnose painful fetal 
conditions weeks or even months before birth.109  These fetuses would benefit from 
pain management until the condition can be corrected.  Until recently, it was 
uncommon for the parents of male newborns to be consulted about whether they 
wanted their infant to receive anesthesia or analgesia for a circumcision surgery.  A 
child recently born should be eligible for the same protection as the unborn child.  
Yet the UCPA Act does not require a physician to offer anesthesia for the fetus 
during labor and birth, does not require ongoing pain management for fetuses with 
painful conditions, and does not require parents to acknowledge the likelihood of 
significant pain before authorizing circumcision surgery for their newly born 
child.110   
Congress has been criticized for relying on unproven “facts” and forcing 
physicians to deliver its message to women contemplating abortion.  The bill 
contains the following factual findings: (i) at twenty weeks after fertilization a fetus 
has the “physical structures necessary to experience pain;” (ii) “substantial 
evidence” shows that fetus at this gestational age “draw away from certain stimuli” 
in a manner that suggests that they are responding to a painful stimulus; (iii) fetus 
who undergo prenatal surgery at twenty or more weeks post-fertilization routinely 
receive anesthesia; and (iv) “substantial evidence” shows that abortion procedures 
are painful to the fetus.111   
In November 2005, Congress held oversight hearings on the UCPA Act and 
invited two physicians, an attorney, and a medical ethicist to testify.112  Dr. 
Kanwaljeet Anand, a pediatrician and professor at the University of Arkansas for 
Medical Sciences, testified in support of the proposed law.113  He was previously the 
government’s expert witness in the three District Court challenges to the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act.114  Dr. Anand contended that a fetus is capable of 
                                                                
108Some authors have suggested providing analgesia for painful fetal conditions, such as 
instrumental vaginal delivery.  Huang, supra note 106, at 122 (citing V. Glover & N.M. Fisk, 
Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY 881, 881-886 (1999); J.S. Deprest et al., Operative Fetoscopy: New 
Perspective in Fetal Therapy?, 17 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1247, 1247-60 (1997).   
109Huang, supra note 106, at 121, 122. 
110Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th  Cong. (2005).   
111Id. at § 2. 
112Erin K. McCormick, House Holds Unborn Child Pain Hearing, THE WILBERFORCE 
FORUM, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.wilberforce.org/article.asp?ID=1041. 
113Id. Dr. Anand has published several studies on neonatal hormonal stress responses. See 
K.S. Anand, Relationships Between Stress Responses and Clinical Outcome in Newborns, 
Infants, and Children, 21 CRITICAL CARE MED. 358, 358-59 (1993); Sinno H.P. Simmons et 
al., Do We Still Hurt Newborn Babies? A Prospective Study of Procedural Pain and Analgesia 
in Neonates, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1058, 1058-64 (2003). 
114For a critique of Dr. Anand’s testimony, see Derbyshire, supra note 83.  “His testimony 
in California, Nebraska, and New York, for which he was paid $450 an hour plus expenses by 
the current U.S. government, was based on an evidently dubious and shaky claim of ‘medical 
certainty.’” Id. 
282 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 20:267 
experiencing pain after twenty weeks gestation.115 He attacked a meta-analysis of 
fetal pain research recently published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association [hereinafter JAMA].116  
Dr. Jean Wright, Professor and Chair of Pediatrics at the Mercer School of 
Medicine, has worked with premature infants for several decades.117  Based on her 
clinical experience, Dr. Wright testified that infants born at twenty-three weeks and 
beyond are capable of feeling pain.118  Law professor Teresa Collett testified that 
requiring physicians to inform patients about fetal pain would be consistent with the 
Court’s informed consent jurisprudence.119 
Only one expert witness opposed the UCPA Act.  Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of 
the Center for Bioethics and Department of Medical Ethics at the University of 
Pennsylvania, opposed the legislation, primarily because there is no medical 
consensus on fetal pain and the risks associated with anesthesia outweigh the 
possible benefits.120  He also testified that it would be poor public policy for 
Congress to decide that a physician must “represent something as a fact which is not 
known to be true or agreed upon by the majority of medical and scientific experts as 
valid.”121   
The hearings were also notable for the physicians and scientists who were not 
asked to present evidence.  The committee did not hear from Dr. Stuart Derbyshire, 
assistant professor of radiology and anesthesiology at the University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, and a critic of Dr. Anand.122  It did not solicit testimony from any of 
the investigators responsible for the JAMA article entitled Fetal Pain: A Systematic 
Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence.123  None of the leading fetal surgery 
                                                                
115While testifying for the government in the PBABA trials, Dr. Anand acknowledged that 
investigators at Britain’s Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists placed the age at 
no earlier than twenty-six weeks. Cynthia L. Cooper, ‘Fetal Pain’ Bill New Item on Anti-
Choice Agenda, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 16, 2004, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/ 
dyn/aid/1951. 






122See generally Derbyshire, supra note 83. 
123Lee, supra note 22.  The article was authored by an attorney and four physicians at the 
University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) who concluded that fetal pain is unlikely 
before the third trimester of pregnancy. Id.  UCSF is one of only three U.S. medical centers 
selected to participate in a five year study of fetal surgery for spina bifida, the most common 
fetal anomaly amenable to surgery, funded by the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development. Id. See MOMS: Management of Myelomeningocele Study, 
http://www.spin abifidamoms.com/english/faq.html (last visited May 4, 2007).  The study will 
compare the outcome of fetal surgery for spina bifida against the traditional treatment of 
surgery after birth.  Id. 
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centers were represented before the committee.124  The committee did not take 
testimony from investigators at Britain’s Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, although Dr. Anand had earlier acknowledged that their research 
placed the age at which a fetus could possibly experience pain at no earlier than 
twenty-six weeks.125  The UCPA Act is positioned to make a huge impact on 
reproductive health.  Congress, therefore, has an obligation to consider all of the 
available research before imposing this legislation on the American people.  Inviting 
testimony primarily from those who support the law in question is unfair to 
constituents and undermines congressional credibility. 
C. Potential Impact of the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act 
If enacted, such a law would have a significant effect on abortion providers.  
Unlike the law at issue in Rust, the UCPA Act applies to all physicians that practice 
abortion, not merely those receiving federal funds.126  In contrast to the challenged 
state law in Casey, the UCPA Act does not create an exception where disclosure 
would adversely affect the patient’s physical or mental health.127  Further, the UCPA 
Act criminalizes violations and imposes penalties ranging from one hundred to two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars and suspension or revocation of the violator’s medical 
license.128    
The impact on women seeking abortion services will be substantial and 
multifaceted.  After being subjected to the mandatory disclosure, some women will 
undoubtedly elect to have fetal anesthesia.  According to medical literature, there are 
two options for delivering anesthesia or analgesic drugs to the fetus.129  The first 
method involves administering anesthesia to the pregnant woman in order for it to 
                                                                
124Cf. MOMS: Management of Myelomeningocele Study, http://www.spinabifidamoms. 
com/english/faq.html (last visited May 4, 2007).  For an overview of fetal surgery, see 
Michael R. Harrison, Fetal Surgery: Trials, Tribulations, and Turf, 38 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 
275, 275-82 (2003).   
125Cooper, supra note 115; see also McCormick, supra note 112. 
126Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).   
127Id. 
128Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, §2904(d)-(e):  
(d) First Offense- Upon a finding by a court that a respondent in an action commenced 
under this section has knowingly violated a provision of this title, the court shall notify 
the appropriate State medical licensing authority in order to effect the suspension of 
the respondent's medical license in accordance with the regulations and procedures 
promulgated under section 2905, or shall assess a civil penalty against the respondent 
in an amount not to exceed $100,000, or both. (e) Second Offense- Upon a finding by 
a court that the respondent in an action commenced under this section has knowingly 
violated a provision of this title and the respondent has been found to have knowingly 
violated a provision of this title on a prior occasion, the court shall notify the 
appropriate State medical licensing authority in order to effect the revocation of the 
respondent's medical license in accordance with the regulations and procedures 
promulgated under section 2905, or shall assess a civil penalty against the respondent 
in an amount not to exceed $250,000, or both.   
Id. 
129Huang, supra note 106, at 122. 
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cross the placenta and affect the fetus indirectly.130  Congressional findings, 
however, discounted the value of indirect anesthesia to the fetus.131  “Expert 
testimony confirms that by twenty weeks after fertilization an unborn child may 
experience substantial pain even if the woman herself has received local analgesic or 
general anesthesia.  Medical science is capable of reducing such pain through the 
administration of anesthesia or other pain-reducing drugs directly to the unborn 
child.”132 
The second option, the one chosen by Congress, is the direct administration of 
anesthesia or other pain-reducing drugs.133  Yet there are currently “no established 
protocols [] for administering anesthesia or analgesia directly to the fetus. . . .”134  
Experimental techniques have been employed in laboratory settings but have not 
“been shown to decrease fetal pain and are of unknown safety in humans.”135   
Another important consideration is that anesthesia, especially general anesthesia, 
has emerged as one of the leading causes of abortion related death.136  Consequently, 
a woman desiring fetal anesthesia would need an anesthesiologist with sufficient 
expertise to achieve optimal fetal anesthesia while ensuring that the woman’s own 
health and safety were protected to the fullest extent.137   
                                                                
130Id.  This method is “considered to provide adequate fetal anesthesia” during surgical 
procedures on the fetus, such as repair of myelomeningocele. Id. This approach would present 
numerous problems.  Although inhaled anesthetics cross the placenta, the amount of anesthetic 
required to anesthetize the fetus is unknown. Nicola M. Miller et al., The Fetal Patient, in 
ANESTHESIA FOR FETAL INTERVENTION AND SURGERY 1, 6 (2005).  
131Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, § 2(5)-(6).  
132Id. 
133Id. See Huang, supra note 106, at 121-22. This article suggested that when a fetus 
undergoes surgery and where the mother has not received general anesthesia, injection of 
opioids and muscle relaxants into the umbilical cord or directly into fetal muscle tissue would 
decrease the fetal stress response.  The article distinguishes between fetal pain and the fetal 
stress response.   
According to the definitions of pain and feeling, a fetus definitely cannot feel pain. 
Fetuses do have hormonal and hemodynamic responses to invasive stimuli, however, 
indicating that invasive procedures cause fetal stress responses.  The concern of the 
authors was that noxious stimuli, even where the fetus is not conscious of it, “most 
likely induce[s] long-term neurodevelopmental changes” in the fetus.  Fetal stress 
responses can be blocked by analgesia, but it is not clear whether effective analgesia 
can impact long-term effects.  The authors concluded that further study is needed to 
ascertain whether analgesia and anesthesia are capable of preventing the long-term 
neurodevelopmental effects.  
Id. Long-term fetal neurodevelopment is obviously not a consideration when weighing the 
benefits of anesthesia or analgesia for abortion.   
134Lee, supra note 22, at 952; see also Huang, supra note 106.   
135Lee, supra note 22, at 952.   
136H.W. Lawson et al., Abortion Mortality: United States, 1972 through 1987, 171 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1365, 1368-69, 1371 (1994).  
137For a thorough discussion of necessary considerations for fetal anesthesia, see Miller et 
al., supra note 130, at 1-12.  
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Finding a qualified practitioner could be difficult because fetal anesthesia is just 
emerging as a specialty.138  The increased cost associated with specialized anesthesia 
might prevent some women from choosing abortion. Issues of access and 
affordability would likely delay the abortion procedure, which in turn would create 
an increased risk of morbidity and mortality.139  In an analysis of abortion related 
deaths occurring in the United States between 1972 and 1987, investigators found 
that women having abortions at twenty weeks gestation or later were about eight 
times more likely to die as their counterparts undergoing abortion at eleven to twelve 
weeks.140  Studies have clearly demonstrated that mandated waiting periods of 
twenty-four to forty-eight hours result in women having later abortions later in 
pregnancy and there is no evidence that arranging for fetal anesthesia would be 
different.141  The probable effect of the UCPA Act on abortion timing and, 
consequently, abortion morbidity and mortality are important factors that Congress 
should weigh against any perceived fetal benefit prior to voting on this legislation. 
One final adverse effect of the UCPA Act is that it subjects a woman’s choice to 
the influence of congressional “findings” unsupported by medical consensus.  Given 
the status often afforded high ranking politicians, these findings may carry more 
weight than they merit.  Congress does not have the education and training necessary 
to make medical recommendations, nor does it have the relationship with or 
responsibility to individual patients that doctors have. Where the law has already 
established the duty that physicians owe patients and where patients have a remedy 
for injuries resulting from breach of this duty, public policy weighs in favor of 
                                                                
138Laura B. Myers, Fetal Surgery: The Anesthesia Perspective (2003) (unpublished 
comment, on file with author). In the preface to this text, physician-authors Laura Myers and 
Linda Bulich warn:  
With fetal intervention, the anesthesiologist is placed in a unique position, required to 
provide anesthesia for two, or possibly three, patients simultaneously.  These patients 
may each have different and, at times, conflicting anesthetic requirements. . . . As a 
result, an anesthesiologist, facing a proposed fetal intervention, may not possess the 
necessary information needed to ensure maternal and fetal safety and a successful 
intervention without first doing an extensive literature search.  Even with the literature 
at hand, vast gaps in knowledge exist in regard to the anesthetic care of these patients.   
LAURA B. MYERS & LINDA A. BULICH, ANESTHESIA FOR FETAL INTERVENTION AND SURGERY 1 
(2005). 
139Lawson, supra note 136.   
140Id.  See also Slava V. Gaufberg, Abortion Complications, EMEDICINE, http://www. 
emedicine.com/emerg/topic4.htm (last visited May 4, 2007). Press Release, American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Most Maternal Deaths from Abortion Could be Avoided if 
Procedure Performed Earlier (Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with author). “There is a 38% increase in 
death risk for induced abortion with each additional week of pregnancy.” Id. 
141American Civil Liberties Union, Government-Mandated Delays Before Abortion (Jan. 
15, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/ReproductiveRights/ReproductiveRights.cfm?ID=9045&c= 
143.  For example, after Mississippi enacted a mandatory waiting period law, “the proportion 
of abortions performed after the first trimester increased by 40 percent.” Id.  “As the American 
Medical Association in its report on abortion states, ‘Mandatory waiting periods [and other 
barriers] have the potential to threaten the safety of induced abortion.  [They] increase[ ] the 
gestational age at which the induced pregnancy termination occurs, thereby also increasing the 
risk associated with the procedure.’” Id.   
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physicians, not Congress, providing the information patients need to consent in a 
truly informed way. 
V.  INFORMED CONSENT LAWS 
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court identified a fundamental right 
of privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142  The Court 
held that this right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to 
terminate her pregnancy.143  On the other hand, the Court recognized a state’s right to 
regulate abortion based on its interests in maternal health and in potential life.144  In 
Roe, the Court applied a trimester framework and required states to demonstrate a 
compelling interest served by laws regulating abortion.145  During the first trimester, 
a state’s interests, although important and legitimate, are not compelling.146 Thus any 
law that unduly burdens abortion in the first trimester is invalid.147  The states’ 
interests become greater as pregnancy progresses.148  Shortly after Roe v. Wade, 
states began enacting informed consent laws mandating the disclosure of specified 
information.  The Supreme Court considered challenges to three such statutes in the 
immediate aftermath of Roe. 
A.  Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth 
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Mississippi’s 
abortion statute, which included an informed consent provision.149  The contested 
language provided that “[n]o abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy except: . . . (2) After the woman, prior to submitting to 
the abortion, certifies in writing her consent to the abortion and that her consent is 
informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.”150  The Supreme Court 
                                                                
142Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
143Id.  
144Id. at 162-63. 
145Id. at 163-64; Leigh v. Olsen, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D.N.D. 1980). 
146Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.   
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at 
approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established 
medical fact (internal citation omitted) that until the end of the first trimester mortality 
in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. … With respect to the 
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at 
viability. 
Id.  
147Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1343 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)). 
148Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. 
149Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
150Id. at 85.   
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upheld the lower court’s finding that the informed consent requirement was a 
constitutional exercise of the state’s authority.151   
The Court pointed out that Mississippi’s statute merely required written 
documentation of a patient’s informed and freely given consent.152  The Court 
defined consent as “the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be 
done and as to its consequences.”153  The Court cautioned in dictum that reading 
informed consent to mean more than that “might well confine the attending 
physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his 
profession.”154  The point at which an informed consent law unconstitutionally 
circumscribed the exchange of information between a patient and her doctor would 
be squarely presented in future cases. 
B.  Franklin v. Fitzpatrick 
At issue in Franklin, was a Pennsylvania statute making it a first degree 
misdemeanor for a physician to perform an abortion without first obtaining informed 
consent.155 To meet the statutory “informed consent” requirement the woman seeking 
the abortion had to affirmatively state in writing that she had been told that abortion 
may cause “detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not foreseeable 
. . . . [that there are] alternatives to abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and 
[given an explanation of] the medical procedures to be used.”156  A federal district 
court upheld the constitutionality of the law.157  The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed without rendering a written opinion.158 
C.  Freiman v. Ashcroft 
In Freiman, physicians brought suit to prevent enforcement of a Missouri 
law requiring them to inform a woman considering an abortion that if the abortion 
resulted in a live infant, her parental rights would be terminated.159  The law also 
required that prior to the abortion the physician certify that the fetus was not 
viable.160  Since an abortion could not be performed unless the fetus was certified as 
nonviable, the court held that the language was “for all practical purposes 
meaningless.”161   
                                                                
151Id. at 66-67. 
152Id. at 85. 
153Id. at 67 n.8. 
154Id. 
155Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d sub 
nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). 
156Id. at 583-84 (Green, J., dissenting).   
157Id. 
158Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).   
159Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 248-49 (8th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 440 U.S. 941 (1979). 
160Id. at 251. 
161Id.  
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court, concluding 
that the provision violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.162  The Eighth Circuit went further, conveying 
in dictum that the state may not require physicians “to provide to each patient any 
and all information required by the state, regardless of its legality, truth, 
constitutionality or medical advisability.”163  Again, the United States Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed.164 
Following the Supreme Court’s instruction in Danforth, Franklin, and Freiman, 
states continued to enact legislation dictating the content of informed consent for 
abortion procedures.  
D.  Leigh v. Olson 
In this 1980 District Court case, a physician and an abortion counselor challenged 
a North Dakota informed consent statute.165  They asserted that providing the 
information unduly burdened a woman’s right to decide, in consultation with her 
physician, whether to have an abortion.166  The abortion providers in Leigh 
specifically disputed the validity of telling patients that abortion was associated with 
“psychological trauma . . . sterility and increases in the incidence of premature births, 
tubal pregnancies and stillbirths in subsequent pregnancies . . .” where there was 
broad disagreement in the medical community over the accuracy of these “facts.”167     
The court turned to the standards set by the United States Supreme Court in 
Danforth.168  Based on those standards, the court found that the North Dakota statute 
went beyond both the definition of informed consent articulated in Danforth and the 
medical community’s understanding of the term.169 In addition, the statute prescribed 
the giving of information that was of “questionable truth and validity”170  The court 
found such information to be a direct burden on the abortion decision.171  As to the 
statutory requirement that physicians disclose the “probable anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of the unborn child,” the court found that it imposed an 
                                                                
162Id. at 252.  “It is a violation of the due process clause because of the invasion into the 
delicate and private physician-patient relationship.  Requiring the physician to relate section 
188.040 interferes with the woman’s right to consult with her physician concerning her 
decision of abortion without undue restriction by the state.” Id.  It is a violation of the equal 
protection clause “inasmuch as it singles out the abortion operation for this ‘straitjacket’ 
requirement.” Id. 
163Id. at 251. 
164Freiman v. Ashcroft, 440 U.S. 941 (1979). 
165Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980). 
166Id. at 1344. 
167Id. at 1345. 
168Id. at 1344 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)). 
169Id. at 1345. 
170Id.  
171Id.  
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undue burden and additionally found no legitimate medical reason for giving the 
information.172   
E.  Charles v. Carey 
In Charles v. Carey, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated 
several appeals from a lower court that were based on the court’s decision not to 
enjoin sections of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.173  The Seventh Circuit 
addressed the constitutionality of three separate sections, which defined the elements 
necessary to obtain informed consent.174  Among other things, the statute required a 
physician to provide the following information at least twenty-four hours prior to the 
procedure: (i) the name of the physician who would be performing the abortion 
(although the act mandated that the physician performing the abortion also be the 
person providing the informed consent information); (ii) medical risks associated 
with the abortion procedure; (iii) probable gestational age of the fetus; (iv) the 
availability of state sanctioned materials detailing the anatomical characteristics of a 
fetus at various stages of gestation, including information on the possibility of fetal 
survival; and (v) a true copy of the patient’s pregnancy test.175  Failure to do so was a 
Class B misdemeanor.176  Another section provided criminal penalties for a physician 
who failed to “inform the patient of any reasonable medical certainty of organic pain 
to the fetus” and methods for controlling fetal pain.177  The law required a patient be 
given all of the informed consent information regardless of gestational age.178 
The State of Illinois argued that the law did not infringe a woman’s 
constitutionally protected right to abortion, and was, therefore, not subject to strict 
scrutiny because it applied only to physicians.179  The Seventh Circuit, applying 
Danforth, found that a law regulating only physician practice might still impose a 
substantial obstacle to the exercise of a woman’s fundamental right if it interfered 
with her ability to rely on her physician’s advice.180  The Seventh Circuit held that 
the Illinois statute imposed such an obstacle and was, therefore, unconstitutional.181  
Further, the court found that, on the basis of the expert testimony in the record, the 
required information about fetal pain was “medically meaningless, confusing, 
medically unjustified, and contraindicated, causing cruel and harmful stress to . . . 
patients.”182 
                                                                
172Id.  
173Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1980). 
174Id. at 775-76.  
175Id. at 781.  
176Id. at 781 n.11. 




181Id. at 782-83. 
182Id. at 784; see also Collett, supra note 99, at 173. 
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F.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
The United States Supreme Court again considered the limits of informed 
consent in 1992.183  The statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey directed a physician or “qualified nonphysician” to inform the 
patient about materials published by the state that describe the fetus, provide 
information about medical assistance for childbirth and about child support 
obligations, and list agencies that provide adoption.184  Under the law, a woman 
could not have an abortion without first certifying in writing that she had been 
offered the state published materials.185   
The Supreme Court expressly renounced its decision in Thornburgh where it held 
that a similar statute was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s 
message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue 
between the woman and her physician.”186  The Casey plurality said that requiring a 
woman be informed about the availability of state published materials, even where 
those materials contained information about the “consequences to the fetus” with no 
direct relation to the woman’s health, was not a substantial obstacle to obtaining an 
abortion.187  The test articulated by the Supreme Court in Casey is whether the 
information is “truthful and not misleading.”188  A state’s requirement that physicians 
disclose information that meets this standard “may be permissible.”189   
Two recently published law review articles maintain that the UCPA Act is 
consistent with the plurality opinion in Casey.190  An article by Professor Teresa 
Collett discounted claims that the UCPA Act impermissibly intrudes into the doctor-
patient relationship.191 The article pointed out that the Casey plurality “specifically 
approve[d] the providing of information ‘relating to the consequences to the fetus, 
even when those consequences have no direct relation to her [the woman’s] 
health.’”192  Fetal pain undoubtedly fits into the category of information approved by 
the Supreme Court in Casey.  What the argument fails to consider, however, is that 
the informed consent statute in Casey required physicians to disclose information 
                                                                
183Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
184Id. at 881. 
185Id.  
186Id. at 883. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986). 
187Id. at 882-83. “[I]nformed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all 
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.” Id. at 883. 
188Id. at 882. 
189Id.  Casey concluded that “[i]f the information the state requires to be made available to 
the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.” Id. See also 
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
190Collett, supra note 99; see also Note, The Science, Law, and Politics of Fetal Pain 
Legislation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2025 (2002). 
191Collett, supra note 99, at 180. 
192Id. at 181 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)). 
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that the Supreme Court determined to be “truthful and not misleading.”193  If the 
UCPA Act passes, the information physicians will be required to give cannot be 
fairly described as “truthful and not misleading.”  There is currently no consensus as 
to when or even if fetuses experience pain.   
In the other law review article about fetal pain, the author described the 
mandatory fetal pain language in the UCPA Act as, “just a specific form of 
information on fetal development that describes a consequence of the fetus’s 
anatomical, physiological, and neurological development.”194 Fetal neurological 
development is indeed one of the issues involved in the debate about fetal pain.  
Experts in the field of fetal development, however, do not agree about the ability of 
fetuses to experience pain.  Neither do they concur as to the validity of the fetal pain 
information contained in the UCPA Act.  Although the UCPA Act information 
relates to fetal development and is permissible, it fails Casey's “truthful and not 
misleading” test.195 
G.  Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Siegelman 
In 2002, a group of health care facilities and physicians challenged the 
constitutionality of Alabama’s Woman’s Right to Know Act.196  The Act forced 
physicians to give “certain information and a designated set of printed informational 
materials . . . ” to women seeking abortion.197 The plaintiffs objected to a section of 
the statute mandating that abortion providers inform patients that “an unborn child 
with the gestational age of nineteen weeks can survive outside the womb.”198  They 
argued that the information was medically untrue and, thus, unconstitutional under 
Casey.199   
The District Court heard the testimony of several experts, who were able to agree 
only that the meaning of “survive” varies between health care providers and in 
different situations.200  The court concluded that the language was misleading.201  
Although technically truthful, the information was misleading because it was 
incomplete.  In order to meet Casey's “truthful and not misleading” standard the 
court held that abortion providers must go beyond the language of the statute and 
inform patients “about the meaning of the term survival as well as the nature and 
extent of any possible survival. . . . [J]ust as a woman has a right to know that there 
                                                                
193Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
194Note, supra note 190, at 2025 (citation omitted). 
195Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
196Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
197Id. at 1197. 
198Id. at 1203. “[I]f the unborn child is viable or has reached a gestational age of more than 
19 weeks,” the physician or qualified person must inform the patient that “the unborn child 
may be able to survive outside the womb.” Id. (quoting Alabama’s Woman's Right to Know 
Act, ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(3)(a) (2007)). 
199Id.  
200Id.  
201Id. at 1203-04. 
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may be even momentary ‘survival,’ she has a right to be fully informed of the nature 
of such survival.”202   
The standard articulated by the court in Siegelman adopts the definition of 
informed consent proposed by research biochemist and philosopher Dr. Irving,203 and 
should be considered in any challenge to the fetal pain act.  Patients are entitled to 
scientifically proven information.  Fetal pain, like fetal survival, contains qualitative 
components that should be part of the informed consent discussion.   
Fetal pain, nonetheless, presents a slightly different problem than fetal survival.  
Siegelman considered a statute requiring disclosure of truthful information about 
survival that was misleading because it was incomplete.204  The court was able to 
remedy the defect by mandating disclosure of additional truthful information, thus, 
aligning the statutorily mandated informed consent with Casey’s “truthful and not 
misleading” standard.205  In contrast, the obligation that Congress seeks to impose on 
physicians via the UCPA Act is to disclose information that is arguably untrue.206 
The question of truthfulness is further complicated because there is presently no 
scientifically sound way to determine whether fetuses perceive pain.207 Generally, 
doctors rely on patients to express and explain their pain and on observable indicia of 
pain.  A fetus cannot communicate experiences so pain must be measured in some 
other way.  
There are measurable physiologic signs associated with pain, but their presence 
alone cannot confirm the existence of pain.208  Based on what science currently 
knows about fetal neurological development, some investigators conclude that 
fetuses do not feel pain.209  Even among experts who think that fetuses can feel pain, 
there is wide disagreement as to the gestational age where this becomes possible.210    
Fetal pain is different from survival in that far less is known about it. Where 
experts do not agree on the nature of fetal pain or a fetus’s ability to experience pain 
                                                                
202Id. at 1204.   
[T]he court holds that physicians and qualified persons must go beyond a simple 
mechanical reading of this provision and provide the woman with the following 
information: 1) a full and complete definition of the term ‘survive’ in accordance with 
the physician's good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature of any survival; 3) survival 
is merely a possibility; 4) survival will or may be of extremely limited duration. 
(citation omitted)  The evidence in the record suggests multiple definitions of the word 
‘survival,’ ranging from living to 120 days after birth to simply surviving for a few 
minutes. 
Id. at 1203. 
203Statement of Dr. Dianne Irving, supra note 36. 
204Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d at 1203-04.   
205Id.    
206Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Congress (2005).   
207Lee, supra note 22.  
208Id. 
209“According to the definitions of pain and feeling, a fetus definitely cannot feel pain.” 
Huang, supra note 106, at 121. 
210Id. 
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at all, physicians cannot simply “go beyond the language of the statute” and 
supplement statutorily mandated information.211  To meet their legal duty to present 
truthful information, physicians must refrain from presenting information not proven 
to be truthful.   
Charles v. Carey is the only lower court opinion considering the constitutionality 
of informed consent language about fetal pain.212  The Charles court issued its 
opinion prior to Casey.213  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
arrived at the result that Casey would have compelled.  The court rejected the fetal 
pain language on the ground that the experts did not agree that the information was 
accurate.214  Absent consensus in the scientific community, the court was unwilling 
to impose on physicians an obligation to convey the state mandated information.215  
As Siegelman made clear, the scientific and medical communities are no closer to 
consensus today than in 1980 when the Seventh Circuit decided Carey.216   
VI. THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ARTICLE 
A team of physicians at the University of California at San Francisco reviewed 
existing literature related to pain in fetuses less than thirty weeks gestational age.217  
The pending UCPA Act was the catalyst for their meta-analysis; the stated purpose 
was to determine whether a fetus feels pain and, if so, whether safe and effective 
techniques exist for administering direct fetal anesthesia. 218  
The study first addressed the nature of pain, describing it as a “subjective sensory 
and emotional experience that requires the presence of consciousness to permit 
recognition of a stimulus as unpleasant.”219  Pain is distinguishable from nociception, 
which involves activation of nociceptive pathways but no subjective experience of 
pain.220 By way of example, a person with a spinal cord injury will have nociception 
                                                                
211Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d 1194, 1203-04 (M.D. Ala. 
2002). 
212Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1980); Collett, supra note 99, at 172-
73. 
213Carey, 627 F.2d at 772. 
214Id. at 784. 
215Id. 
216Id. 
217Lee, supra note 22. 
218Id. at 947. 
219Id. at 948 (citing D. Benatar & M. Benatar, A pain in the Fetus: Toward Ending 
Confusion About Fetal Pain, 15 BIOETHICS 57, 57-76 (2001) and V. Glover & N.M. Fisk, 
Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY 881, 881-86 (1999) and International Association for the Study of Pain, IASP 
Pain Terminology (2004), available at http://www.iasp-pain.org/terms-p.html (last visited 
May 4, 2007)). 
220Huang, supra note 106, at 119.  Nociception requires only an intact sensory system.  
The experience of pain, on the other hand, requires “nociception and a subjective, emotional 
reaction.” In order for an emotional reaction to occur, there must be consciousness. Id.  See 
also Lee, supra note 22, at 949.  
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without pain below the level of the injury.221  Conversely, a person may experience 
pain without stimulation of nociceptive pathways, like phantom pain in an amputated 
limb.222 
Whether a fetus has the capacity to experience pain depends on several factors.  
First, the pathways between the thalamus and the cortex, the thalamocortical 
pathways, must be present and functional.223  There are no studies that establish the 
point in gestational development at which thalamic pain fibers reach the cortex.  The 
authors of the JAMA article examined several very small studies from which they 
were able to draw inferences about the development of thalamocortical pathways.224  
The presence of the pathways, while necessary, is not sufficient to establish the 
capacity for pain.225  The structures must also be functional.226   
Cortical function is measured using electroencephalography (EEG).227  An EEG 
alone, however, is not adequate to demonstrate functionality.228  This is known 
because infants born with no functional neural tissue above the brainstem may still 
have EEG activity.229 Another drawback to relying on an EEG study is that there is 
no known EEG “pain pattern.”230  Some investigators posit that EEG patterns 
denoting wakefulness correspond with consciousness.231  Since consciousness is a 
requisite of pain perception, this would pinpoint the earliest possible age at which a 
fetus might experience pain.232  In pre-term infants, EEG indicators of consciousness 
do not appear until approximately thirty weeks.233  EEG alone does not prove 
consciousness, however, because patients in a persistent vegetative state sometimes 
have EEGs demonstrating wakefulness.234 
                                                                
221Lee, supra note 22, at 949. 
222Id.  
223Id.  
224Id.  A histological study of the visual pathway involved eight fetuses; a similar study 
had seven fetuses; a third study of mediodorsal thalamic afferents included eight fetuses; a 
study of afferents from unspecified thalamic regions examined twelve fetuses. Id. 









234Id. (citing D. Benatar & M. Benatar, A Pain in the Fetus: Toward Ending Confusion 
About Fetal Pain, 15 BIOETHICS 57, 57-76 (2001) and J.A. Burgess & S.A. Tawia, When Did 
You First Begin to Feel it? - Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness, 10 BIOETHICS 
1, 1-26 (1996)). 
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Researchers have relied on behavioral indications to prove the conscious 
awareness of pain, including withdrawal from a painful stimulus and facial 
grimacing.235  The authors of the JAMA article evaluated behavioral studies where 
researchers identified a distinct set of facial movements that were present in the 
newborn infant during invasive procedures but absent during noninvasive 
procedures.236  The earliest age at which these facial movements were identified was 
at twenty-eight to thirty weeks.237  One study, however, found no difference in facial 
movements in newborns “with and without significant cortical injury,” meaning that 
facial movements may not represent conscious perception of pain.238 
Other known stress responses, such as vital signs, neuroendocrine changes, and 
altered fetal blood flow have been used to imply conscious fetal pain.239  Researchers 
have measured stress responses in fetuses undergoing invasive procedures and noted 
changes in fetuses as early as sixteen weeks gestational age.240  Still, not all 
investigators agree with using neuroendocrine stress response “as a surrogate 
indicator of fetal pain. . . . [t]his has limitations: stress responses do not necessarily 
signify pain . . . and stress responses do not involve the cortex.”241  The JAMA article 
concluded, on the basis of the studies reviewed, that neuroendocrine measurements 
are not valid indicators of fetal pain.242   
Based on the analysis of the existing studies, which was limited and undertaken 
with very small study groups, the JAMA article authors concluded that a fetus cannot 
perceive pain until the thalamocortical pathways become functional at around 
twenty-nine to thirty weeks gestational age.243  Prior to that time, fetal anesthesia 
would be of no benefit to the fetus but would impose added risks to the pregnant 
woman.244  Whether fetal anesthesia should be undertaken requires an analysis of its 
potential benefit to the fetus and the potential risks to the pregnant woman.245 
                                                                
235Lee, supra note 22, at 950; Huang, supra note 106, at 119.  “Since the fetus cannot tell 
us whether he feels pain and since pain cannot be addressed using objective measures, only 
indirect methods are useful to determine whether or not the fetus feels pain.” Id. 




240Id.  See also Huang, supra note 106, at 121. Dr. Anand’s own research measured 
hormonal stress responses in newborn infants following invasive interventions. Id. at 120. 
241Id.  
242Lee, supra note 22, at 950-51 (citing G.A. Carrasco & L.D. Van de Kar, 
Neuroendocrine Pharmacology of Stress, 463 EUROPEAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 235, 235-272 
(2003)). The body mediates neuroendocrine responses without conscious cortical processing.  
Id. 
243Id. at 952.  Abortion is extremely rare in the third trimester and is only performed to 
save the health or life of the pregnant woman.  Id. 
244Lawson, supra note 136; see also, Miller, supra note 130.  
245Lawson, supra note 136; Lee, supra note 22, at 952. General anesthesia increases 
abortion morbidity and mortality as well as cost. Id. at 952.   
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Critics of the JAMA article have attacked it largely on two grounds: two of the 
researchers failed to disclose conflicts of interest, and the article is a meta-analysis of 
existing research and presents no new research.246  Dr. Eleanor A. Drey is medical 
director of the abortion clinic at San Francisco General Hospital. Her affiliation was 
not disclosed in the study and neither was that of another author, reported to have 
worked for an abortion rights organization.247  Critics point out that the authors’ 
failure to consider that these affiliations might be perceived as conflicts of interest 
“illustrate the very bias they deny.”248   
While not disclosing potentially conflicting affiliations does detract from the 
credibility of the entire article, it does not mean that the article completely lacks 
merit.  Rather, physicians who perform abortions should keep these conflicts in mind 
when considering this JAMA article.  Prudence would require physicians to review 
the underlying research as well as other research in the area of fetal pain.  Under the 
standard set forth in Siegelman, abortion providers have a legal duty to educate 
themselves about the findings of medical studies on the topic of fetal pain.249 Even in 
the absence of a legal duty, physicians are ethically obligated to offer patients the 
benefit of the latest, scientifically sound information available.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the lower courts has taken pressure off of the 
law makers who felt compelled to put a stop to mid-trimester surgical abortion. 
Consequently, it is far less likely that these individuals will continue in their efforts 
to pass the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005.  It is foreseeable that in the 
future, however, some members of Congress will determine that other abortion 
methods should be outlawed.  An outright prohibition on those abortion methods that 
remain legal would face tremendous social and legal challenges. Legislation targeted 
at “informing” a woman about the characteristics of the fetus, however, could be 
viewed as merely educational.  Any law that mandates what physicians must say to 
their patients is potentially problematic.  It the case of the Unborn Child Pain 
Awareness Act of 2005, one problem was that experts in the area of fetal 
development disagreed about whether the information subject to mandatory 
disclosure met the “truthful and not misleading” standard.  
Society at large believes and government supports the notion that the decision 
whether to abort a pregnancy is one that should be made on the basis of all of the 
information that is available.  Roe v. Wade held that a woman has a constitutionally 
protected right to make this decision, and Casey held that a state may not create an 
                                                                
246Press Release, National Right to Life Committe, Gullible Treatment of Trumped up 
“Study” on Fetal Pain Issue Should Embarrass J.A.M.A. and Some Journalists (Aug. 25, 
2005), available at http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/fetal_pain/NRLCrebuttalJAMA.html.  See 
also McCormick, supra note 112 (quoting Dr. K.S. Anand’s critique of the JAMA article). 
247Randy Dotinga, Researcher Stands by Fetal Pain Findings, HEALTH DAY NEWS, Aug. 
24, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/lifestyle/health/feeds/hscout/2005/08/24/hscout527596.html. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported the authors’ affiliations. Id.  
248William Saletan, I Feel Your Fetus’s Pain: Compassionate Conservatism Enters the 
Womb, SLATE, Aug. 31, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2125299/#ContinueArticle. 
249Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d 1194, 1203-04 (M.D. Ala. 
2002). 
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undue burden on a woman in the exercise of this right.250  Casey itself, and 
subsequent lower court opinions, have interpreted the phrase “undue burden” to 
allow states to impose informed consent requirements on physicians who perform 
abortions.251  Under Casey, a state may require a physician to disclose information 
that is “truthful and not misleading.”252  According to the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, requiring physicians to tell patients that a fetus experiences pain 
fails Casey’s “truthful and not misleading” standard because it is “medically 
meaningless, confusing, medically unjustified, and contraindicated, causing cruel 
and harmful stress to . . . patients.”253  Although there has been investigation into 
fetal pain during the twenty-five years since Charles v. Carey, medical science 
seems to be no closer to reaching an agreement about if and when a fetus feels pain.   
Women are entitled to make fully informed decisions about abortion.  Until 
questions concerning fetal consciousness and fetal pain are more clearly answered, 
physicians or other qualified caregivers should provide current, scientifically 
credible information.  Each woman, acting with the advice of her physician, is then 
free to weigh all of the factors involved and make the decision best suited to her 
individual needs.  To the extent that legislation, such as the Unborn Child Pain 
Awareness Act of 2003, prevents a complete discussion of the factors influencing the 
abortion decision, it should not be enforced. 
                                                                
250Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 883-84 (1992).  
251Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994). 
252Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
253Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Collett, supra note 99, at 
173. 
